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RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY. Ronald F. Thiemann.1 Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press. 1996. Pp. xiii, 186. Cloth,
$55.00; Paper, $17.95.
Scott C. Idleman2
It is ironic, but not entirely surprising, that our constitutional
jurisprudence of religion has substantially evolved to date without the serious influence of those, such as theologians and clergy,
who are most learned in the nature and practice of religion.
Although religious experts are occasionally summoned for testimonial purposes and courts occasionally advert to authoritative
works on religion-and while there are, to be sure, a handful of
legal professionals who actually have formal training in religion-by and large these are exceptions to the self-styled autonomy of the law. Indeed, despite suggestions to the contrary, law
remains the lawyer's dominion, and the law of religion is no
exception.3
It is precisely this context that makes Ronald Thiemann's
Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy all the more
interesting and valuable a contribution to the field.4 An ordained Lutheran minister and a theologian of genuine caliber,
Thiemann poses in his book the familiar question: "What role
should religion and religiously based moral convictions play
1. Dean, Harvard Divinity School, and John Lord O'Brian Professor of Divinity,
Harvard University.
2. Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. I would like to thank
Elizabeth Staton Idleman and Daniel P. Meyer for their insightful comments.
3. For a recent exhortation to the legal community to engage in a deeper understanding of religion and its relationship to culture and society, see Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Paying the Words Extra. Religious Discourse in the Supreme Court of the United
States (Harvard U. Press, 1994).
4. Thiemann is also the author of Constructinga Public Theology: The Church in a
Pluralistic Culture (Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991) and Revelation and Theology:
The Gospel as NarratedPromise (U. of Notre Dame Press, 1985), as well as the editor of
The Legacy of H. Richard Niebuhr (Fortress Press, 1991).
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within American public life?"5 (p. 2) Weaving together a wide
range of disciplines (from history to theology to law to political
and moral philosophy), Thiemann ultimately responds to the inquiry by articulating both a reconceptualization of the First
Amendment religion clauses and a revised theory of modern
political liberalism. This revised theory, according to Thiemann,
would exalt the central values of classical liberalism, yet comprehend public life not as a neutral forum, but as a process by which
citizens search for relative commonality among competing visions of the good. And, together with his overhaul of First
Amendment jurisprudence, it would provide "a principled way of
thinking about religion in public life that will allow the courts,
constitutional scholars, and legal practitioners to identify the situations that require separation and those in which cooperation is
to be encouraged." (p. 66)
I
Religion in Public Life begins with the premise that built
into the American constitutional order, consistent with James
Madison's theologically grounded conception of religious liberty
and manifest in the First Amendment religion clauses, are the
core values of liberty, equality, and toleration. Effectively omitted from the founders' constitutional design, however, was an operative mechanism that would foster and sustain, over time, a
citizenry who would embrace and actuate these values in the nation's public life. Madison's theory of political factionalization,
for example, seems to negate any hope that the necessary virtue
resides in the citizens themselves, while Madison's apparent faith
that representative government would sustain these values is
functionally deficient without some accompanying nonstructural
theory of virtuous governance. (pp. 24-26) In short, says
Thieman, the founders bestowed upon us a blueprint for constitutional democracy that is "conceptually incomplete and thus politically flawed" (p. 26)-a machine that would possibly, but not
assuredly, go of itself.6
Central to this omission, he maintains, is the founders' specific failure to address the place of religion in public life, particu5. Earlier expositions of his thinking on the subject include Ronald F. Thiemann,
Beyond the Separationof Church and State; Public Religion and ConstitutionalValues, 66
N.Y. St. Bar J. 48 (May-June 1994), and 'Wall of Separation' Outmoded, Christian Sci.
Monitor 18 (Nov. 26, 1993) (interviewing Thiemann).
6. For an interesting and recent examination of specific framers' views toward the
role of religion in the new republic, see John G. West, Jr., The Politics of Revelation and
Reason: Religion and Civic Life in the New Nation 11-78 (U. Press of Kansas, 1996).
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larly the systematic role of religion, at the institutional and
cultural level, in sustaining these core values. Until this century,
as one might have predicted, this void was effectively filled by an
"unofficial 'established piety"-a quasi-Rousseauian civil religion drawn largely from the symbols and substance of American
Protestant Christianity. (pp. 27-32) Yet, "[a]s Christianity began
to decline in cultural influence and secularism and religious pluralism began to increase, the American civil piety lost its ability
to shape civic virtue within the republic." (p. 32) In turn, this
"fragmentation of American civil religion had a dual effect: it allowed the emergence of voices that had long lay silent under the
stifling influence of the majority tradition, and it exposed the
founders' failure to articulate a vision by which civic virtue could
be nurtured in a truly diverse population." (pp. 32-33)
Thiemann's ultimate goal (and it is no modest endeavor) is
once again to fill the void created by the framers' omission.
Rather than pursue the reestablishment of a de facto civil religion, however, Thiemann advocates the recognition of the importance of social institutions, including religious communities and
other public but nongovernmental associations, in sustaining the
values of the liberal tradition (liberty, equality, and toleration)
and contributing to meaningful political dialogue concerning the
welfare of society. What is needed, he contends, is "a revised
liberal conception of constitutional democracy, one that
welcomes the voices of those religious individuals and institutions committed to the fundamental values of democratic politics." (p. 90) Obstructing his ideal, however-and from his
perspective merely compounding the founders' error of omission-are two related and rather formidable impediments: first,
the Supreme Court's conceptualization and interpretation of the
First Amendment religion clauses over the past half-century, and
second, the modem liberal tenet that religious arguments, in order to further these core values, should be substantially if not
totally excluded from the public discursive sphere.
II
On the constitutional front, Thiemann defines the problem
as the Court's fixation on separation and neutrality, among
others, as the governing motifs of its First Amendment religion
jurisprudence. "The phrase 'the separation of church and state,'
and its attendant metaphor 'a wall of separation between church
and state,"' are, he contends, hopelessly cramped and misleading
in their formulation. (pp. 42-43)
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While the phrases identify one aspect of government's relation
to religion, they deflect our attention from other fundamental
features of the first amendment guarantees. By focusing on
religious and governmental institutions they obscure the essential concern for individual freedom and equality that undergirds both the "no establishment" and the "free exercise"
clause. By speaking of "church and state," they seduce us into
thinking of these complicated and textured organizations
(communities of faith and governmental agencies) in singular
and monolithic terms. By defining the relation between religion and government with the simple word "separation," these
phrases conceal the variety of ways in which these two entities
interact, and the phrase consequently constrains our ability to
imagine new possibilities for their relationship.
(pp. 42-43) Moreover, the notion of "separation" is often quite
unhelpful in the actual disposition of First Amendment controversies, as illustrated by the internally inconsistent body of Establishment Clause precedent, both before and especially after
its doctrinal articulation in Lemon v. Kurtzman.7
Thiemann also has little regard for the Court's other principal buzzwords of the religion clauses, particularly "neutrality"
and "accommodation." Like separation, neutrality is a highly
relative and elusive term-Thiemann calls it a "protean concept"
(p.60)-and indeed "[m]uch of the conceptual confusion surrounding the interpretation of the religion clauses has resulted
from the different, and often contradictory, construals of the
meaning of neutrality." (p. 57) Even the notion of accommodation is vulnerable to broadly differing interpretations depending
upon the disposition of any particular interpreter. In short, argues Thiemann, "[t]he principle, 'the separation of church and
state,' and the associated concepts, accommodation and neutrality, have been subjected to such diverse and contradictory interpretations that they have been rendered virtually useless for the
task of reconstructing a proper concept of the role of religion in
public life." (p. 66)
Accordingly, Thiemann urges that the Court discard, in part
or in whole, the concepts of separation, neutrality, and accommodation as the reigning rhetorical commitments of First Amendment religion jurisprudence and that it move beyond the
constraining concepts of "church" and "state" as the principal
7. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Thiemann invokes County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
GreaterPittsburghChapter,492 U.S. 573 (1989), as a clear illustration of "the complicated
and contradictory pattern of reasoning that characterizes current judicial deliberations on
issues of religion in public life." See pp. 45-54.
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descriptors of the complex and variable relationship between
religion and government. Additionally, the Court should no
longer interpret the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses independent of one another, but should instead seek an integrated
interpretation grounded in those values-liberty, equality, and
toleration-which gave rise to both clauses.8 The Court should
"ask not simply about the intentions of the framers of the Constitution but about the values they sought to inscribe in the text"
and how "the historical and cultural changes of the past two hundred years affect the way we apply those values to our current
policy problems .... ." (p. 45)
Four principles, in particular, should guide this reformation
of First Amendment jurisprudence.
First, religious freedom should be protected as a fundamental
right to be constrained only if there is a compelling governmental interest at stake.... Second, religious traditions should
be dealt with equally under the law.... But this principle does
not justify the "secular purpose" criterion, or prohibit government from supporting initiatives that allow for the equal flourishing of diverse religious practices. Third, if religion is to play
a larger role in American public life, the courts must take special care to note whether apparent "facially neutral" regulations actually create an unfair burden for religious
communities ....
Fourth, minority religions are particularly
vulnerable to the "tyranny of the majority," and their freedoms must be guarded with especial care.
(p. 167) Thiemann contends that, if applied, these principles
would increase both the protection of nonmainstream religious
practices and the quality of reasoning of Establishment Clause
cases. Under his reformed jurisprudence, prayer in public
schools would still be prohibited insofar as it restricts the religious liberty of some students, but moments of silence would be
permitted. Governmental aid for religious schools, if identical to
aid offered to nonreligious private schools, would be permitted
as long as such aid does not directly contribute to the advancement of the religious subject matter taught in the school. Additionally, governments would be prohibited from sponsoring
religious observances of any kind, though they should take no
8. "[S]ince the same three values [liberty, equality, and toleration] provide the basis for both religion clauses, the Supreme Court's practice of adopting independent traditions of adjudication for those clauses is simply indefensible." (p. 74) Moreover, "[b]y
adopting parallel and independent standards for interpretation, the Court ... has ...
created a heightened and artificial sense of the conflict between the clauses, thereby obscuring the unifying elements that hold them together." (p. 60)
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steps to constrain the ability of communities of faith to display
their own symbols on religious holidays.
(pp. 167-68) Before proceeding to his companion analysis of
modem political liberalism, it seems necessary to inject a few remarks about Thiemann's critique of extant First Amendment jurisprudence and his corresponding outline for reform. While
hardly unreasonable in the abstract, 9 there is something ultimately unsatisfying about his prescriptive framework for adjudication under the religion clauses. It is not that the depth of his
critique meaningfully differs from other portions of the book
(which are quite good), but rather that the particular subject of
the critique-the interpretation of a provision of the federal
Constitution-necessarily demands more specificity, and perhaps
more innovativeness, than Thiemann offers.' 0 Judges are in
many respects the final interpreters of the religion clauses and, as
such, typically need more than generalized policy mandates.
Although it is true that they seek doctrines that allow for some
measure of judgment and flexibility, they also seek doctrines that
can produce (or at least appear to produce) predictable results
within the confines of particular controversies. The muchmaligned Lemon test, even if farcical in substance, is hardly aberrational in form. It was crafted (and to some extent survives)
because it minimally provides both this doctrinal structure and
this residual flexibility, however inconsistent its results may be."1
Without providing some comparable degree of structure, the
value of Thiemann's normative proposals is necessarily diminished within the actual context of constitutional interpretation.12
9. Similar critiques abound. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief.
How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 105-210 (Basic Books,
1993); Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Rhetoric of Church and State: A CriticalAnalysis of
Religion Clause Jurisprudence(Duke U. Press, 1995).
10. Although it is true, as Steven Smith notes, that legal scholarship need not be
normative to be either sound or useful, see Steven D. Smith, ForeordainedFailure: The
Questfor a ConstitutionalPrincipleof Religious Freedom vii (Oxford U. Press, 1995), it is
doubtless also true that once one crosses the normative threshold, the worth or persuasiveness of one's position may hinge on the specificity of its formulation and the concreteness of its application.
11. Cf. Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 865,866-70 (1993).
12. Cf. Margaret O'Brien Steinfels, Civic Virtue, N.Y. Times Book Review, Sec. 7, at
21 (July 14, 1996) ("Mr. Thiemann's philosophical diagnosis is persuasive, but his practical
remedies are obscure. The variables in play-the Court, judicial appointments, the religious right, the secularization of America, etc.-are so complex that it is hard to judge,
without greater detail, how his revised liberalism might work."). This is perhaps somewhat ironic given Thiemann's assertion that "[fludgments about whether a religious argument should be introduced into public debate or about the kind of warrant that is
appropriate are always situation-specific." (p. 171)
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Moreover, it is not clear that Thiemann's prescription is
truly revolutionary, or that he actually departs too far from the
present situation. Thiemann proposes that government aid to
religious schools should be forbidden if it "directly contribute[s]
to the advancement of the religious subject matter taught in the
school" and that the government is forbidden from "sponsoring"
religious observances. (pp. 167-68) But what does it mean to
"directly contribute" to an object's "advancement"-ought one
to look legislative purpose or to effect?-and does this really differ from the standards articulated in Lemon? Likewise, what
does it mean to "sponsor" a religious observance? Most would
agree that the government cannot purchase and supply the
creche or the menorah, for example, but what about the provision of public property on which to locate the religious symbol
(especially if the property is exclusively set aside for that use), or
the nongovernmental placement of a lone religious symbol, say,
on the steps of the county courthouse or in the rotunda of the
state capitol? And what about the religious expression of government employees? May a judge place a crucifix in her courtroom,
or a teacher place the same in his classroom, as a seasonal Christian observance? Is this governmental sponsorship of religion, or
merely a private religious display? Even the prospect of outright
governmental financing of religious observances is not clear-cut.
Is the military, or are prisons, forbidden from employing clergy
to conduct religious holiday services? These are doubtless difficult questions, but that is precisely the point. Just as a metaphor
will not resolve them, neither will a set of abstract principles and
nonspecific terms. In short, while Thiemann's criticisms and his
accompanying proposals are well-taken, and even granting that
his principal goal is to effect change at the conceptual level, it is
not clear that his efforts fulfill the special demands of constitutional interpretation or that they would truly move one beyond
the standards and limitations found in the existing doctrinal
regime.
III
Thiemann's critique of the Court's religion jurisprudence,
especially the concepts of separation and neutrality, leads him
immediately into his critique of modem political liberalism.13
13. In fact, he explicitly associates the two:
The difficulties facing the Court are not sui generis; rather, they derive from
fundamental problems in the liberal political philosophy on which the Court regularly draws. In particular, the notion of neutrality, a fundamental concept of
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His core complaint concerns the insistence, by some of modem
political liberalism's most articulate or noted representatives,
that religious arguments be substantially or thoroughly excluded
from public discourse. Many such philosophers posit that the
state must be "neutral" with regard to conceptions of the good or
of the "good life," and that public discourse, correspondingly,
should be accessible to all able-minded members of the political
community. Religion, in their estimation, produces arguments
that necessarily inject (contested) conceptions of the good into
the public realm and that necessarily involve inaccessible or unduly inflexible forms of reasoning and authority.
Thiemann, for his part, finds these foundational claims to be
questionable at best. Governmental neutrality, he contends, is
fundamentally a myth-"to pretend that the defense of liberty is
an exercise in 'neutrality' seems an act of folly" (p. 79)-and a
socially destructive one at that. "When, under the guise of neutrality, government actually prefers one conception of the good
over another, it misleads the public concerning government's
roles in the adjudication of volatile moral and political matters
... [and] contributes to the growing public suspicion about deception in government." (p. 78) As for the corollary notion that
religious arguments are intrinsically too inaccessible or inflexible
for inclusion within public dialogue, Thiemann remains likewise
unconvinced. A great deal turns, he observes, on one's conceptualization of religion and religious faith. For Thiemann, "faith is
not primarily an individual phenomenon; it is, rather, an aspect
of the life, practice, and world view of a religious community""the set of convictions that defines the identity of a community
and its members." (p. 132) Yet these convictions "do not dwell
in some private inaccessible realm; they are present 'in, with and
under' the myths, narratives, rituals, and doctrines of the community." (p. 132) Accordingly, "[i]f you seek to understand the
faith of a religious community, you must inquire into its literature, lore, and liturgy." (p. 132)
Given this understanding, even "the faith that Jesus Christ is
risen and present within the contemporary Christian community"
is
not private, inaccessible, or hidden from public scrutiny.
While few people outside the Christian community have undertaken the study necessary to understand this belief, that is
liberal philosophy, bedevils every attempt of the Court to develop a consistent
and coherent judicial framework for interpretation of the first amendment religion clauses. (p. 60)
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not because the belief itself is private or inaccessible. Even
though it is not a widely shared belief ... , it is still a genuinely
public belief, namely, a belief available for public analysis.

(pp. 132-33) Nor can it be said that religious beliefs are excludable on the basis of their alleged incorrigibility, that is, their
unamenability to modification, where amenability is presumably
a key ingredient of the public dialogic process. While it is true,
he acknowledges, that certain "fundamental beliefs resist revision, they are not in a logically strong sense incorrigible. The
history of religion is replete with examples of fundamental restructuring of communal identity that have occurred when basic
convictions have been revised or jettisoned."14 (p. 134) Moreover, while it is also true that
[t]he convictions of faith may... call forth from the religious
person a distinctive level of commitment and devotion,... the
fact and function of such basic orienting convictions is common to every human life.... [R]eligious convictions, though
they are directed toward a distinctive "object" or "horizon of
meaning," do not differ in kind or in function from the fundamental commitments that orient the lives of nonreligious
persons.

(p. 155) Finally, and in all events, the attempt to disqualify incorrigibility runs contrary to the tradition of dissent, which has
played such a crucial role in our constitutional and national
moral development, and which "is precisely what the religion
clauses of the first amendment are designed to protect."15 (p.
134)
Even John Rawls's modified version of modern liberalism,
according to Thiemann, does not convincingly establish the ne14. See also pp. 159-64 (critiquing the "mythology of religious absolutism").
15. Thiemann does not entertain the thesis that religious arguments may prove
uniquely alienating to nonbelievers because the relevant source of normative authority is
typically of an extrahuman or supernatural sort. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Political
Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 Yale L.J. 1611 (1993) (advancing this position). Such
a thesis, however, necessarily rests on a controversial empirical-philosophical assumption
about the relative subjective perception of arguments in the public sphere and an equally
controversial assumption that there exist meaningful moral claims which do not advert to
sources of authority that are not in some sense extrahuman, supernatural, or otherwise
beyond material sensibility. Why a particular religious (or nonreligious) citizen, for example, would or should find any less alienating the claim by a nonbeliever that physicianassisted suicide or pornography or abortion is wrong "because my heart tells me so" or
"because I feel it to be wrong" is not obvious. Indeed, as Thiemann notes, at least the
religious citizen is usually capable of concretely articulating the nature and source of normative authority undergirding her political arguments, which may not be the case with
nonbelievers who may rely on nothing more than ungrounded or nonsystematic moral
intuition.
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cessity or legitimacy of excluding most religious arguments.
Rather than employ the rhetoric of neutrality, Rawls depicts the
substantive structure of the democratic constitutional order in relation to certain principles (such as fairness or equality) that may
be deemed authoritative, not because they form part of a single,
fully comprehensive conception of the good or because they are
inherently neutral, but because they reflect an overlapping consensus or common ground. The first principles of Rawls's political liberalism are thus supposedly "free-standing"; they are
political, not philosophical. In turn, Rawls would exclude religious arguments to the extent they undermine the overlapping
consensus with competing comprehensive notions of the good,
assert values inconsistent with those embodied in the overlapping
consensus, or otherwise deviate from Rawls's ideal of public reason, which, in all but a handful of circumstances, must govern
civil debate.16 (pp. 82-86)
Though praiseful of Rawls's efforts, particularly the attempt
to transcend the emptiness of neutrality, Thiemann nevertheless
finds Rawls's model of public life insufficient. He points out, for
example, that Rawls's vision is predicated on the existence of a
"well-ordered society," in which the overlapping consensus is
sufficiently established and meaningful so as to be operative.
But, notes Thiemann, even the United States is not, and perhaps
should not be, a "well-ordered society" in that sense of the term.
The values of justice and equality, though collectively embraced
in the abstract, find their meaning and application through constant revision and critique, especially by those citizens and institutions, like religious ones, that bear allegiance to competing
sources of normative insight and authority. (pp. 87-88, 147)
More generally, Thiemann calls into question the entire notion
that a viable set of free-standing principles can truly subsist apart
from, or remain conceptually independent of, one or more comprehensive schemes or notions of the good.
From Thiemann's perspective, then, Rawls errs in attempting to seal off his overlapping consensus from these ambient
sources of moral influence, including those of a religious nature.
Just as problematic in Thiemann's view, however, is the effort of
16. Public reason, corresponding to Rawls's "conditions of publicity," entails an
"appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial."
(p. 84) (quoting John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism 224 (Columbia U. Press, 1993)). For
criticism, see Michael J. Perry, Religion in Politics: Constitutionaland Moral Perspectives
(Oxford U. Press, forthcoming 1997); Kent Greenawalt, Some Problemswith PublicReason in John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1303 (1995).
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communitarians (what he calls "sectarian communitarians") to
discredit modem liberalism in toto because of certain perceived
fundamental deficiencies (e.g., that liberalism entails a cramped
view of the self and of political community, and essentially
reduces politics to unrestrained self-interest). While not unsympathetic to the communitarian critique, he suggests that often it
rests on an incomplete caricature of liberalism and that communitarians have not provided (and perhaps cannot provide) an
acceptable alternative that tempers certain key aspects of community, namely, the emphasis on exclusionary homogeneity and
the reliance on external threats. (pp. 103-04)
Thiemann ultimately situates himself within an emerging
movement of "liberal revisionism," composed of "philosophers
and political theorists who are seeking to find a middle way between classical modem liberalism and sectarian communitarianism."17 (p. 105) The liberal revisionist, according to Thiemann,
accepts both the liberal commitment to a noncomprehensive,
political, descriptive model of society premised on the values of
liberty, equality, and tolerance and the communitarian commitment to "a more robust sense of civil obligation and virtuous citizenship." (p. 105) But the revisionist departs from the view,
held in common by both modem liberalism and communitarianism, that "moral disagreements in a pluralistic society are inadjudicable because competing moral arguments emerge from
incommensurable premises and values." (p. 107) From a revisionist standpoint,
Moral disagreements... are often vigorous and occasionally
irresolvable in practice, but such disagreements take place
against a broad background of fundamental consensus concerning the goods that ought to be pursued in a liberal democracy. That consensus is itself revisable and open to critical
questioning, but the elements comprised by it are never simultaneously and universally called into question. Indeed, genuine disagreement requires some common premises or else the
contending positions would simply "talk past one another"
rather than engage in true conflict. 18
17. For another recent and insightful book situated more or less within this movement, see Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Disconten" America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Harvard U. Press, 1996).
18. There may, however, be a point beyond which disagreement is functionally indistinguishable from incommensurability, e.g., where the discourse, though shared, is
nonetheless intrinsically incapable of producing genuinely persuasive arguments. See,
e.g., Louis Michael Seidman and Mark V. Thshnet, Remnants of Belief. Contemporary
ConstitutionalIssues (Oxford U. Press, 1996) (proposing that contemporary constitutional
discourse has possibly reached this point).
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(p. 107) Finding untenable the notion of pervasive incommensurability, revisionism thus seeks to maximize the normative commonality among all citizens, rather than simply to maximize it
among subgroups of citizens, as with communitarianism, or to
minimize it among all citizens, as with unrevised liberalism.
In so doing, revisionism necessarily contemplates the inclusion within the realm of public discourse of arguments (including
religious arguments) about the good. And this of course simply
resurrects the liberal concern, perfectly valid in Thiemann's view,
about the limits of imposing through the state and other public
institutions a conception of the good, particularized in the form
of law, upon less-than-amenable citizens. To be sure, Thiemann
recognizes that the "central challenge of revisionist liberal politics is to develop a polity that honors personal freedom and yet
appeals to a sense of common obligation freely offered by the
citizenry." (p. 109) The solution, he says, entails moving away
from the notion that pluralism necessitates a near-exclusive commitment to individualism, and achieving a more "proper balance
... between personal and civic freedom, between individual and
associative pluralism." (p. 111) Such a balance is necessary if
only for the sake of individualism itself, as "[t]he personal freedom so prized by modern classical liberalismpresupposes a social
network of corporate life." (p. 111)
Within the revisionist paradigm, both the function of social
institutions and the nature of citizenship would reflect this balance. "[A] revised liberal polity would provide support and encouragement for those communities that foster the skills of
pluralist citizenship: the ability to function virtuously and effectively within a diverse society." (pp. 112-13) This pluralist citizen would possess
neither the "unencumbered self" of classical modem liberalism nor the "constitutive self" shaped within a single intact
community. Rather, the self of the pluralist citizen [would
be]-to use a religious metaphor-the "pilgrim self," a person
shaped within inherited communities of character but free to
enjoy the mobility of liberal society.
(p. 113) And public life, including not only the government but
also other public but nongovernmental associations, would "provide[ ] the forum within which the ongoing discussion concerning
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the goods and purposes of liberal society [would take] place."19
(p. 113)
As for the specific role of religion in public life (or "public
religion") within the revised liberal political order, Thiemann acknowledges that this is a more complex matter. After all, simply
because one can demonstrate the legitimacy, necessity, or even
the inevitability of permitting arguments about the good into
public discourse does not mean that all such arguments, including
those of a religious nature, are of equal propriety or standing. In
fact, Thiemann does advocate that the public discursive sphere
should be governed, though not steadfastly so, by certain "conditions of publicity." Far from being rigidly exclusive, Thiemann's
conditions constitute an attempt not only to locate common or
shared beliefs, but also to "respect the particularity of each citizen's commitments and convictions," that is, "to address issues of
dissent as well as consent within democratic conversation." (p.
124)
Thiemann proposes three such conditions or norms of publicity-the norm of public accessibility, the norm of mutual respect, and the norm of moral integrity-all of which derive
legitimacy from their congruence with the core values of liberty,
equality, and toleration. First, the norm of public accessibility
urges (but, as with the other norms, does not require2o) that arguments be grounded in premises that are open to public examination and scrutiny, not necessarily for the purpose of persuasion
but, at the very least, for the purpose of understanding. Adherence to this norm contributes both to "the democratic goal of
peaceful and reasonable resolution of conflict and disagreement"
and to "the mutual understanding and respect so essential to the
development of the pluralist citizen." (p. 135) The norm of mutual respect, in turn, encourages citizens to
grant to those with whom they disagree the same consideration that they themselves would hope to receive.... Citizens
who manifest the virtue of mutual respect acknowledge the
moral agency of those with whom they disagree and thereby
19. Thiemann advances a broad conception of what qualifies as "public," and would
include within the term's ambit not only government entities, but also influential corporations and a wide range of voluntary associations, including unions, civic clubs, citizen action groups, communities of faith and religious service agencies, and the like. See pp. 9697, 151-53.
20. Although the practical distinction is not entirely clear, he contends that these
norms "should function not as threshold requirements but as... criteria that democratic
citizens should employ to evaluate arguments in the public domain." (p. 135)
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treat their arguments as grounded not simply in personal preference or self-interest but in genuine moral conviction.
(p. 136) Finally, the norm of moral integrity (drawn from the
work of Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson) entails three
subnorms: (1) consistency of speech (i.e., the articulation of positions that genuinely reflect one's moral principles), (2) consistency between speech and action (i.e., the actual implementation
of one's stated positions), and (3) integrity of principle (i.e., adherence to one's underlying principles "consistently across a variety of cases").21 (p. 137)

Religious arguments, in Thiemann's view, are fully capable
of satisfying these conditions of publicity no less than their nonreligious counterparts. The norm of moral integrity, in particular, may even be exemplified by the dissenting religious
argument. (p. 138) Religious citizens hold dual allegiances that
serve both to connect them to the enterprise they criticize (they
are "connected critics" in Michael Walzer's words) and, yet, to
distance themselves from that enterprise and thereby maintain a
less temporally and politically contingent perspective. (p. 139)
But the right to dissent must operate "in concert with the other
two basic criteria: the criteria of public accessibility and mutual
respect. Citizens engaged in acts of dissent should seek, so far as
possible, to make the moral reasons for their actions available to
a broad democratic public." (p. 139) Likewise, "[w]hile they
may vigorously oppose the practices, behavior, and policies of
those with whom they disagree, they should avoid behavior that
denies the moral agency of their opponents. To dehumanize
one's opponents in the process of dissent is to undermine the
moral integrity of the very conscience that motives these actions." (p. 139)
Having established that arguments about the good must be
permitted to shape public discourse, and that religious arguments
may not categorically be excluded as a matter of principle or prudence,22 Thiemann asserts that the critical question "is not
21. In addition to the conditions of publicity that Thiemann offers as guideposts for
citizen participation in public discourse, he also suggests that government officials who
advert to religious values or rely on religious arguments have an independent obligation
to employ such values or arguments with some measure of criticalness, (pp. 5-9) and that
religious beliefs "cannot be decisive," (p. 8) at least in the adjudicatory context.
22. Thiemann rounds out the case for religious arguments in law and politics by
time-honored appeals to democracy, tradition, and inevitability. "Given the pervasiveness and importance of religious convictions within the American populace, it would indeed be odd to deny such profound sentiments any role in public life." (p. 3) Moreover,
"[g]iven the historic significance of religion in shaping our national political culture, the
removal of religion from the 'public square' would seem to violate our most ancient tradi-
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whether religious arguments qualify as genuinely public, but
what kind of religious arguments so qualify." (p. 150) "The important issue," in other words, "is not whether an argument appeals to a religious warrant; the issue is whether the warrant,
religious or not, is compatible with the basic values of our constitutional democracy." (p. 156) In this regard, Thiemann suggests
that there are certain substantive stances, such as those which
espouse racial or religious bigotry, (p. 156) or certain states of
mind, such as those which do claim absolute and exclusive truth
and thoroughly deny the possible validity of competing positions,
(pp. 159-64) that ultimately appear incompatible with core democratic values. But their incompatibility is not a consequence of
the fact that they may happen to be (or not to be) arguments of a
religious or religiously motivated nature.
What, then, ought to be the role of religion in public life?
By allowing arguments about the good in general, and religious
arguments in particular, to enter public debate, one role of religion is plainly to inform public policy, often in a uniquely critical
manner reflecting the divided loyalty or dual allegiances of religious citizens. Yet, by heeding Thiemann's conditions of publicity, this role will be circumscribed (minimally so, but
circumscribed nonetheless) by the substantive and procedural
demands of the democratic, pluralistic political realm. At the
same time, many religious institutions will assist in the maintenance of this realm by instilling in each citizen and generation a
moral framework that renders meaningful the essential values of
liberty, equality, and toleration. And, as long as this role is both
protected and permitted by the First Amendment-neither undermined by a restrictive reading of the Free Exercise Clause nor
nullified by an over-expansive reading of the Establishment
Clause-these institutions will generally be able to maintain fidelity to their religious mandates while concomitantly preserving
the integrity and essential moral dimension of the nation's public
life.

tions." (pp. 3-4) "Religion has always exercised significant influence in American public
affairs-for good and ill. If we are to develop a more sophisticated understanding of
religion's public role, we must begin by acknowledging the inevitable impact of religion
upon public affairs." (p. 173) At the very least, the "case against public religion or theology must confront the strong historical tradition that legitimizes the use of theological
arguments in defense of the constitutional values of freedom, equality, and toleration."
(p. 74)
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CONCLUSION
Ronald Thiemann's Religion in Public Life is truly a welcome addition to the ever-expanding literature on religion, law,
and politics. His work presents a well-reasoned, even-handed,
and intellectually defensible attempt to bring some measure of
balance to its subject. Though perhaps slightly too abstract in its
formulation and possibly a bit too wide-ranging in its breadth,
these arguably are signs not of commonplace deficiency, but of
its potentiality as a work of genuine cultural significance. Especially noteworthy is Thiemann's attempt to render the philosophical and legal dimensions of the debate over religion in public life
accessible to a relatively broad readership. Frequently confined
to certain elite or professional quarters, this debate plainly has
relevance that extends well beyond the academic halls and judicial chambers. The periodic manifestation of elite discourse
through legal doctrines and other expressions of public policy,
and the frequent assertion by proponents that many of its constituent arguments are simply expressions of our deep constitutional
commitments, demand that it not, in fact, stray too far from the
public domain. Religion in Public Life laudably attempts to rein
in both the esotericism and the ideological excess of this debate,
and in so doing makes a genuine contribution to the present and
future understanding of religion as an indelible feature of the
American political landscape.

HeinOnline -- 14 Const. Comment. 229 1997

